If Gendler and Walton illustrate the limitations of philosophical analysis then Goldman's work illustrates the need for critical philosophical reflection to inform the interpretation of neuroscientific results. It might be true that our visual imagination involves our deploying the same regions of the brain and engaging in the same oculormotor activities as genuine perception. But without further argument it is not clear why this should entail that there is any sort of deep connection between images and perceptions, any more than, say, the fact that 'small' and 'malls' share the same letters shows there is a deep connection between malls and small things. Nor is it clear why a rich E-imagination need necessarily involve states that are facsimiles or simulations of ordinary states. It is not obvious, for example, why there could not be creatures who had particular cognitive structures dedicated to supporting states functionally equivalent to, but neurologically quite different from, those generated by our visual imagination. Now this is not at all to say that Goldman is wrong. Far from it. But it is to point out that we must be cautious when drawing consequences about the nature of the imagination from the neuroscientific data. Careful philosophical reflection is needed to interpret that data.

To sum up, Nichols's collection makes an important contribution to a growing field. It will be of particular interest to those interested in the nature of our engagement with fiction, modal epistemology, thought experiments, and the emotions. But it will also be of considerable interest to anyone interested in aesthetics or the study of the mind. Indeed, I suspect that any analytic philosopher will gain a great deal indeed from reading this book.

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Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, edited by Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. Pp. vi + 402. H/b £55.00.

This collection is an excellent resource for anyone interested in the relevance of 'context' to certain central areas of epistemological and/or linguistic debate. It contains eleven original essays by an impressive list of authors, including several essays that are quickly becoming quite well known. Between them, the papers cover a wide and representative range of arguments, issues and positions arising in connection with the prospects for and problems facing contextualism.

Contrary to what the volume's title (and that last sentence) might be taken to imply, but aptly enough, 'contextualism' is not a univocal term—it does not designate a single, monolithic view. Within philosophy these days 'contextualism' has at least two dominant uses: one is to refer to a broad type of (quasi-) epistemological theory, whereby it is only relative to a contextually-determined standard that a knowledge sentence expresses a complete proposition: change the standard, and you change what the sentence expresses; acontextually, however, no such proposition is expressed. Hence the 'quasi' above: this type of epistemic contextualism is not, in itself, a theory about knowledge. (It contrasts, then, with another form of epistemic contextualism—that defended by David Annis and Michael Williams, and sometimes associated with Wittgenstein—which *is* concerned with, so to speak, the metaphysics of knowledge/justified belief.) The second dominant use of 'contextualism' is to refer to a more general semantical-linguistic view or approach, one which sees context as central in one or another way to certain fundamental semantic issues, most centrally meaning itself. Corresponding to these broad areas, the essays in this volume are grouped into two parts: (I) 'Contextualism in Epistemology' and (II) 'Compositionality, Meaning, and Context'. (As the headings indicate, and as we will see below, the latter are a less unified group than the former.)

One of the virtues of epistemic contextualism (EC) is supposed to be that it enables an appealing response to scepticism—since, as uttered, the relevant sentences do not express contrary propositions, the truth of what the sceptic says may be compatible with our everyday non-sceptical attributions of knowledge. Kent Bach (Ch. 3), following some others, argues that in fact EC does not really provide a good response to scepticism. Nor, as he sees it, does the contextualist appreciate the full range of alternatives to her own view, including Bach's own 'moderate invariantist' solution to the particular puzzles or cases which tend to motivate it, whereby we display excessive caution when it comes to unconditionally believing things when the stakes are high—that is why, in the cases in question, one denies that the subject knows that *p*: one is not even sure oneself that *p* is true.

EC is also sometimes said to mark a return to 'ordinary language philosophy', inasmuch as the primary evidence for it is often said to be, as it is said here by Peter Ludlow (Ch. 2) to be, certain everyday linguistic evidence. Others have argued that EC does not really fit well with the linguistic data—or rather with linguistic theory—after all, since, they say, 'knows' does not behave like uncontroversially context-sensitive expressions. Ludlow responds, arguing that EC does not, in fact, conflict with what linguistics tells us about context-sensitive terms/phrases in general.

Timothy Williamson raises a different sort of problem for EC, one arising out of consideration of practical reasoning. Contextualists tend to think of context—that which determines the proposition(s) expressed by tokened knowledge sentences—in terms of such certain features of the speaker's psy-

chology. This gives the speaker a certain authority over what a subject is asking when he wonders, say, whether he knows. But this does not seem right: if anything, the subject's context should have priority here, and contextualism does not respect that fact.

The remaining papers in part (I)—one by Jonathan Schaffer (Ch. 5), another, a co-authored piece by Andy Egan, John Hawthorne and Brian Weatherson (Ch. 6)—do not directly address the prospects for EC. The former is concerned, rather, with the question of 'the internal structure of contextualist theories'—in particular, with whether it is a threshold (of justification), a standard of epistemic position, or the set of alternatives to what is believed, that shifts with context. Schaffer's answer is that, measured against a number of proposed desiderata, including that it 'match intuitions about the acceptability of knowledge ascriptions' and 'connect to the practical role that knowledge ascriptions play within the larger project of inquiry' (pp. 116–17), 'alternatives' emerges as the clearly correct answer. Meanwhile, the epistemic term(s) on which Egan *et al.* focus are those expressing epistemic possibility, such as the 'might' in 'It might rain tomorrow'. 'The modal "might"', they write, 'is, most theorists agree, an *epistemic* modal. So its truth value should depend on what someone knows' (p. 133). Granting the first point, one might well resist the inference here ('So …'), since it begs the question against views which take epistemic notions other than knowledge— evidence, for instance—to lay at the core of the semantics of epistemic possibility statements. In any case, the authors' answer to the question of *whose* knowledge the relevant sentences' truth values depends on is a 'relativistic' one: what matters is not, *contra* the contextualist, the speaker's knowledge, but rather that of whoever happens to be *evaluating* the relevant utterances.

Leading off part (II), François Recanati's (Ch. 7) 'Literalism and Contextualism: Some Varieties' provides a brief history of the progress through various versions of contextualist and non-contextualist ('literalist') theories in the philosophy of language. As Recanati sees it, the movement here is decidedly in the direction of contextualism, which he defines as the view that it is speech acts, rather than sentences, which are the primary bearers of content (p. 171). Those familiar with Recanati's previous work will recognize the form of argument here: very often, it is only in virtue of a significant measure of 'pragmatic composition', relying upon 'background assumptions and world knowledge' (p. 183), that a sentence-token will express a complete proposition (e.g. p. 181): 'We must go beyond linguistic meaning … if we are to make sense of the utterance' (p. 184).

Recanati's paper is nicely paired with Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore's defence (Ch. 8) of precisely the sort of 'literalist' attempt to minimize context-sensitivity which Recanati rejects. Or, rather, theirs is an attempt to minimize context-sensitivity in *semantics*: for of course, as in their *Insensitive Semantics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2005), Cappelen and Lepore's 'semantic minimalism' is coupled with a 'speech act pluralism' whereby 'No one thing is said (or

asserted, or claimed or …) by any utterance: rather, indefinitely many propositions are said, asserted, claimed, or stated' (p. 199). Of course, it is perfectly compatible with 'literalism' to regard this pluralism as perhaps too liberal (e.g. what is communicated might go far beyond what is literally expressed, without being something that is *said*). Likewise, according to some minimalists, we should reject the assumption that is often shared by literalists and non-literalists alike—namely, that an utterance of a sentence must always express a proposition. (See Kent Bach, 'The Excluded Middle: Semantic Minimalism without Minimal Propositions', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 73, 2006, pp. 435–442.) According to Cappelen and Lepore, such propositions are 'minimal' ones, like 'that Steve is tall'. If the latter strikes one as pre-propositional, but one thinks that propositions *are* what is semantically expressed, one will be lead back to Recanati's contextualist view as to the primary bearers of meaning.

Jason Stanley (Ch. 9) defends the view that one's grasp of the 'intuitive truth conditions' of an utterance is due to one's grasp of the compositionality of meanings of the term involved against the charge that it is incompatible with semantic context-sensitivity. Compositionality and its relation to—or alleged tension with—context-sensitivity figures centrally in Peter Pagin's (Ch. 11) contribution as well. Like Stanley, Pagin argues that there really is no incompatibility between the two; here, though, the point of departure is Fodor's argument to the contrary, as it occurs in the course of his attempt to establish the independence of thought from language.

The papers by Paul Pietroski (Ch. 10) and Michael Glanzberg (Ch. 12) have less to do with context-sensitivity *per se*. While the general nature of a theory of meaning is a contentious matter, Pietroski takes as his starting point the assumption that a theory of meaning for a natural language is a theory of understanding rather than, say, a Davidsonian 'theory of truth'. That is, it concerns, not merely such things as word–world relations, but *how* speaker–hearers *associate* each with the other. Finally, Glanzberg explores the phenomenon of expression failure—an utterance's failing to express a (complete) proposition—and attempts to provide a deeper understanding of what lies behind it. His answer is that it arises as a result of a certain type of failure of presupposition. The naturalness of an attempt at *repair* is the key notion here: in the absence of any nearby palm tree, 'That palm tree is going to fall' is naturally met with 'Um, what palm tree?'; when obligatory, the latter type of repair signals the failure of a critical presupposition (here, that there is a suitable referent for the demonstrative), and that failure explains why no proposition is expressed.

At certain points, the connection among the various papers and the views just briefly sketched is direct and explicit. To some extent, this is assured with respect to the papers in part (I), given its comparative topical unity. But the direct connections go beyond that. Thus, for instance: Cappelen and Lepore respond, not just to Recanati, but to Stanley too; Stanley anticipates Pagin's position, while Pagin addresses aspects of what both Stanley and Recanati have

said; Pietowski briefly discusses Cappelen and Lepore's views; and so on. Nor is this surprising. For there are some obvious affinities between the two general forms of contextualism described at the outset. Still, though there are exceptions (including some by contributors to the present volume)—those who work in either of the latter two streams have tended to do so in isolation from the other. Aside from the quality of the papers which comprise it, considered on their own, one of the real strengths of this volume is that it brings the relevant issues and views together in a single place, enabling, even forcing, the reader to consider how they might interact.

At the same time, the volume also helps bring to light some very basic assumptions, both substantive and methodological, which arguably drive much of the debate surrounding contextualism, in whatever form, even though they often go unarticulated. Thus, among those who favour one or another form of contextualism there tends to be a shared methodological commitment to a certain authority of pretheoretic, 'linguistic' intuitions in shaping theories. Relatedly, there is among several of the writers here a shared theoretical commitment to the close connection between meaning and use—between the semantic value of various linguistic items and what is involved, required, etc. for their successful use in communication. And this in turn, as the discussions of Recanati and Pietroski, for example, make clear, is often accompanied by very different conceptions of just what semantics, and the primary bearers of meaning, *are*. Further, as Bach points out (p. 62) in raising a problem for proponents of EC in particular, just about every party to the issues and disputes addressed in this volume is going to reject *some* linguistic uses, and *some* pretheoretic intuitions about the truth values of certain claims, as semantically insignificant. And while imputing inexplicable error to speakers is, methodologically, a strike against a theory, as Egan et al. put it, 'speakers *can* be mistaken in their semantic views in ever so many ways' (p. 146; emphasis added). A theoretical challenge which looms large, then, is to find some principled way of determining when the imputation of such error is acceptable and, relatedly, 'to figure out [just] *how*', on a particular occasion, 'meaning is related to use' (Pietroski, p. 294). It is doubtful that such questions admit of perfectly general answers—that any recipe or calculus for determining such things is forthcoming. But it is another of this collection's virtues that, by bringing together some at times quite divergent views on the relevance (or not) of context to the topics in question, it reveals such issues to be genuinely pressing and in need of greater focused discussion.

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